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May 1989 I. INTRODUCTION 
The decade of the 1980s has been a turbulent one for the United States 
banking and financial system.  Since the establishment of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation  (FDIC)  in 1933,  more than 1,500  banks have been closed. 
Over 800 of these failures occurred during the 1980s with 200 institutions 
failing in 1988 alone.  The dramatic increase in the bank failure rate has 
intensified public criticism of deposit institution  regulators,  since bank 
soundness is a major regulatory responsibility. 
This paper is concerned with modeling and predicting large commercial-bank 
failures.  The adverse consequences of bank failures,  such as loss of 
depositors' funds,  failures of other banks, and financial distress caused by 
sharp contractions in the money supply are no longer considered serious 
concerns because of the Federal Reserve System's lender-of-last-resort 
responsibilities and federal deposit insurance  (Benston,  et al. [I9861  and 
Kaufman [1985]).  Nevertheless,  deposit-insurance agencies are unintentionally 
destabilizing the financial system by subsidizing deposit-institution 
risk-taking through their insurance-pricing,  coverage,  monitoring,  and 
insolvency-resolution policies  (Kane  [1985,  19861 and McCulloch, [1987]). 
Individual-institution insolvencies and failures remain a serious problem for 
the insurance system's implicit guarantors,  namely the general taxpayer and 
conservatively managed institutions. 
In cases where failure cannot be prevented, on average,  the sooner the 
bank is declared insolvent and its management changed,  the smaller the losses 
will be.  Although not openly acknowledged by federal regulators,  this fact 
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Being able to model deposit institution failures can be helpful in  controlling 
taxpayer loss exposure. 
An accurate bank-failure model should begin by distinguishing between 
insolvency and failure.  Insolvency and failure of financial institutions are 
separate processes.  Legal insolvency occurs when an institution cannot cover 
its current liabilities.  In  economic terms,  an institution becomes insolvent 
when the market value of its stockholder-contributed  equity becomes negative. 
This happens when the market value of its nonequity liabilities exceeds the 
market value of its assets,  net of deposit insurance guarantees.  Failure is 
not an automatic consequence of legal or economic insolvency.  It results from 
a conscious decision by regulatory authorities to acknowledge and act upon the 
weakened financial condition of the institution.  Most earlier bank failure 
studies  (Altman  [1977],  Avery and Hanweck [1984],  Barth, et al. [1985]; 
Benston [1985];  Martin [1977];  and Sinkey [1975]) with the exception of 
Gajewski (1988),  have neglected this difference between economic insolvency 
and failure.  Failure is typically studied by analyzing a large number of 
financial ratios as if it were equivalent to insolvency.  All the studies 
concentrate on small,  untraded,  institutions and assume that book values 
provide an unbiased estimate of market-value insolvency. 
This paper goes beyond previous empirical studies in a significant way. 
It proposes to study insolvency and failure simultaneously,  treating economic 
insolvency as only one of the various factors that influence the failure 
decision.  The model of the regulator's failure decision developed here also 
recognizes as relevant factors general economic constraints as well as the 
economic,  political, and bureaucratic constraints faced by the regulators. 
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determinants of economic insolvency and the regulators' reaction to this 
financial condition at the same time. 
The paper is organized as follows:  Section I1 develops the model and its 
theoretical foundation.  The choice of variables and the functional form, as 
well as the expected signs,  are discussed in section 111.  The estimation 
technique and data are explained in section IV.  Section V presents and 
discusses the empirical results;  section VI concludes the paper. 
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2.1 Federal Regulators and their Changing Incentives 
Deposit insurance agencies serve multiple purposes  (Kane, 1985).  Their 
most important goal is to serve the president and the Congress by adapting to 
their economic polPcies and protecting them from public criticism whenever a 
crisis surfaces involving unsafe or unsound banking practices.  Also,  federal 
deposit insurance agencies cooperate with the office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency  (which  charters national banks), state banking departments  (which 
supervise the entry and exit of state-chartered institutions), and the Federal 
Reserve to represent and enforce the beneficial interest of depositors. 
Through periodic examinations and continuous supervision,  regulators try to 
prevent deposit institutions from abusing their informational advantage over 
their customers. These monitoring efforts make it hard for institutions to 
misrepresent their economic condition to depositors. By undertaking to 
guarantee deposits, insurance agencies also relieve the small account-holders 
(up  to $100,000) of any need to worry about their deposits.  Finally, deposit 
insurance has the macroeconomic goal of protecting the "safety and soundness" 
of the banking system.  To promote public confidence in the system, insurance 
agencies try to prevent individual deposit institution failures. 
Trying to achieve multiple goals, deposit insurance agencies often find 
themselves in conflict between the short-run  benefits of avoiding deposit 
institution  failures by bailing out clients and the long-run  effects of such 
actions on market discipline.  In addition to the conflicting goals of the 
insurance agencies, the deposit insurance bureaucrats also face changing 
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they prefer to portray,  are in fact self-interested agents whose 
decisionmaking process is not necessarily determined by society's long-term 
goals.  Kane  (1988)  points out,  that when a problem becomes too difficult to 
resolve,  it is to the regulator's  interest to initially cover up and deny the 
problem instead of honorably confronting it.  Regulators tend to bury their 
heads in the sand and hope the problem will disappear so that they can go on 
to lucrative post-government  jobs,  having adequately met the demands of their 
high post.  Needless to say,  the forbearance policies adopted in pursuit of 
self-interest are far from guarding the long-term interests of the public. 
The interests of the public and regulators once more coincide only when the 
size of the problem becomes so great that the probability of being able to 
further "cover up" and "get away" becomes very small. 
2.2  Insolvency vs. Failure 
The conflicting goals and corrupting incentives of the deposit insurers 
have led to forbearance policies,  creating the distinction between the 
insolvency and the failure of an insured institution.  Economic insolvency 
exists when the market value of an institution's stockholder-contributed 
equity becomes negative.  However,  "failure", the legal recognition of an 
institution's  preexisting economic insolvency,  is an option that the 
regulators may or may not choose to exercise. 
There are five methods available to the regulators for resolving a 
potential failure: 
1.  deposit payoff,  which kills the corporation by putting its offices 
out of operation; 
2.  direct assistance,  usually in the form of a subsidized loan to (or 
taking an equity position in) the institution;' 
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institution; 
4.  reorganization,  which means restructuring the institution's 
uninsured debt;  and 
5.  financially assisted purchase-and-assumption  transactions,  where 
typically a healthier institution purchases at auction some or all 
of the failing institution's assets and assumes all of its 
deposits with compensation the from FDIC to balance the deal 
(Kane, 1985). 
Legally,  each time it resolves an insolvency, the FDIC must choose the 
resolution technique that minimizes the cost to the insurance fund.  However, 
since the performance of insurance-agency bureaucrats is not judged by agency 
profits, in practice,  the insurance agency's  commitment to minimizing the risk 
of cumulative failures modifies its commitment to minimizing the economic 
costs of individual failures 
In an effort to promote public confidence in the banking system and to 
serve their self-interest,  deposit insurers often delay de jure failure of 
insolvent institutions,  creating an artificial difference between insolvency 
and failure.  The myopic handling of insolvencies tends to increase the 
expected future cost to the insurance agencies since the federal guarantees 
establish an asymmetric mechanism for sharing unanticipated gains and losses 
(Kane, 1986).  This asymmetry exists since, due to stockholders' limited 
liability, the guarantor absorbs a larger share of unanticipated losses than 
of unanticipated gains.  By allowing the insolvent institutions to operate, 
the insurance agencies increase the expected future cost to their fund since 
the asymmetry increases as the capital of the institution decreases.  Also, 
uninsured creditors take advantage of this opportunity to improve their 
positions and it becomes in the interest of the stockholders of such 
institutions to take the largest risks possible.  In addition,  subsidies 
designed to stop the cumulative short-run  spread of current losses to a few 
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for all institutions. 
These long-run  and system-wide implicit costs are often ignored.  When a 
failure decision is eventually made, the resolution method chosen is seldom a 
deposit payoff due to the following pressures:  (1)  minimizing explicit 
short-run  costs to the deposit insurance fund,  (2)  political consequences of 
adjustment costs imposed on individuals with broken banking connections,  (3) 
possibility of bank closings being viewed as a blot on regulators' and 
politicians' records,  and  (4)  increasing the chance of disrupting the public's 
confidence in other deposit institutions  (Kane, 1985).  In this study, 
insolvency-resolution methods other than shotgun stockholder 
recapitalization--such as nationalization,  reorganization,  interim FDIC 
operation,  supervisory mergers, and financially assisted purchase and 
assumption transactions--are treated as instances of de facto failure. 
2.3 The Model of the Regulators' Failure Decision 
The model developed here assumes that the regulators' recognition of 
insolvency depends on their minimization  of short-run explicit expected cost 
subject to various economic, political, and bureaucratic constraints.  In each 
period, optimizing regulators are faced with two alternatives 
(failure/continue operation) in their decisionmaking process.  Since one 
alternative must be chosen at each time,  a binary-choice model is appropriate 
here.  The binary decision by the regulators  (about  the ith institution) can 
be conveniently represented by a random variable that takes the value one if a 
failure decision is made and the value zero if the institution is allowed to 
operate.  Since the FDIC's decision cannot be predicted with certainty,  we 
model the choice probabilities.  It is of interest to see how various 
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FDIC. 
Let P  be a latent continuous variable that expresses the outcome of the 
FDIC's binary choice such that: 
F = 1 when a failure decision is made, 
F = 0 when the institution is allowed to continue operation. 
Assume the following regulator cost function: 
F[a(X1>  I  +  (1-F)  [c(X,)  I, 
where 
The functions a(X1)  and c(X2)  are stochastic-constrained  costs of 
failing the institution and allowing it to operate,  respectively.  The 
nonstochastic portions of these expressions can be modeled as linear functions 
of variable vectors,  X1  and Xz.  Any unobservable random influences are 
captured by the stochastic error components e,  and e,. 
Hence,  a failure decision is only made if the constrained cost of failing 
the institution is less than allowing the institution to operate and vice 
versa: 
F=l  if  a(X1> < c(Xz>, 
F=O  4x1)  > c(%>  - 
Now we can define F*  as the net incentive to make a failure decision, 
F* = c  (%)  -  a  (XI)  . 
A failure decision is made if the incentive is greater than zero,  and the 
institution continues to operate autonomously if it is not: 
F=l  ifc>a P>0, 
F=O  c<a  F*<0. 
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F3(=Xp+v  whereX1 ,X2  cXandv=  ec-e, 
then, 
E(W)  = P(F=l)  = P(W > 0) 
= P(XP+v  > 0) 
= P(X/3+ec-e, > 0) 
= P(e,-ec  < Xp) 
=  F(xp> 
where F is the cumulative distribution function of the e,-e,.  The type 
of the probability model we get depends on the assumption about the 
distribution of errors. 
Thus,  the failure equation models a constrained-cost  minimization  by the 
regulators.  The independent variables,  X,  include bank-specific variables, 
general economic condition variables as well as FDIC constraint proxies. 
One of the variables that affect the regulators' failure decision, is the 
market value of stockholder-contributed equity.  This net equity value 
summarizes the bank's financial condition.  Using an option-pricing  equation 
to estimate the value of the federal guarantees  (Schwartz  and Van Order 
[1988];  Markus and Shaked [1984]), it is possible to construct net equity by 
subtracting the estimated guarantee value from the market value of the 
institution.  It is also important to note that the market value of the 
institution,  from which the degree of insolvency  (net  value) is constructed, 
is an endogenous variable itself.  Therefore, there is need for a separate 
equation to study the determinants of economic insolvency  (Maddala, 1986). 
The full model consists of three equations.  The first equation models the 
determinants of economic insolvency or economic value of the institution.  The 
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stockholder-contributed equity,  or net economic value,  by subtracting the 
estimated value of the guarantee from the estimated market value of the 
institution.  Finally, the third equation estimates the probability of a 
failure decision by the regulators.  In symbols: 
mi,&  = h (Y,,$)  + Uli,t  (1) 
A  A 
'Vipt = MVint-Gi,t  and  Gist  = g(Zi,t) + wi,t  (2) 
F. * = f(NV  1.t  i,t, 'i,t)  + Uzi,t  (3 
where, 
mi,t  = market value of the ith institution's  equity at time t. MV 
is the price per equity share multiplied by the number of 
shares outstanding. 
'i,t  = value of the ith institution's explicit and conjectural 
federal guarantees at time t. 
mi,, = net economic value of the ith institution  at time t.  It 
is constructed by subtracting the estimate of the federal 
guarantee value from the estimated market value of the 
institution. 
Firt* = the incentive variable that determines how the FDIC and 
chartering authorities behave,  as explained earlier. 
Yi,,  ,Zip,  and Xitt  = vector of explanatory variables in 
insolvency,  guarantee and failure equations; discussed in 
section I11 and listed in table 2. 
Due to data limitations,  the value of the guarantee will not be estimated 
using the guarantee equation.  As will be explained in section 111,  it is 
possible to estimate this value within the first equation, making use of 
certain simplifying assumptions. 
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3.1  Statistical Market Value Accounting Model 
In the existing literature,  independent variables for studying the 
financial condition of the institutions  (or  their failure,  since the 
distinction is not usually made), are primarily ratios computed from banks' 
regular financial statements.  Akaike's information criterion, which is based 
on the log-likelihood  function of the model,  adjusted for the number of 
estimated coefficients, is commonly used in selecting the combination of 
variables that best fits a given set of data  (Akaike, 1973).  Usually, a large 
number of financial ratios are tried before the final model is obtained. 
One alternative approach,  recently introduced by Kane and Unal (1989),  and 
applied by Thomson  (1987)  is the "Statistical Market Value Accounting Model 
(SMVAM)."  This specification brings structure to the traditional "ad hoc" 
choice of regressors common to balance sheet and income statement analysis. 
Assuming efficient markets,  the model decomposes the market value of a 
firm's  stock into three components.  First,  market value is decomposed into 
hidden and recorded capital reserves.  Second,  hidden capital reserves are 
decomposed into values that are "unbooked but bookable" and "unbookable" 
items.  The model develops explicit estimates of both components of hidden 
capital, 
SMVAM can have a flexible functional form.  However,  the following linear 
relationship is posited as a convenient specification: 
MVi,t  =  Poi,,  + Pli,tBVi,,  + uli,t where, 
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book net worth.  /31i,t  is the valuation ratio of the 
market to book value of the collected components of the ith 
institution's  bookable equity  (BV)  at time t.  Thus, an 
estimate of the "unbooked but bookable" capital is obtained. 
poi,  t  captures the net value of unbookable assets and liabilities of 
firm i at time t.  This value of off-balance-sheet items 
includes the value of a deposit institution's explicit and 
conjectural federal guarantees net of discounted future costs. 
According to the model, the market participants estimate the market value 
of the elements of bookable equity by applying an appropriate mark-up or 
mark-down ratio, (j31i,t),  to the accounting net worth reported by the 
institution.  If this ratio is  (not)  equal to one,  the accounting value of an 
institution's equity represents an  (biased)  unbiased estimate of the 
components of stockholders' equity.  A market premium  (discount)  exists when 
the ratio is greater  (less)  than one.  In  order to construct the market value 
of the institution's equity,  market participants also estimate unbookable 
equity,  the market value of off-balance-sheet  items, which includes the FDIC 
guarantees (point).  A positive  (negative)  value implies that 
unbookable equity serves as a net source of  (drain  on) the institution's 
capital. 
Hence in the above equation,  ,L? .  is the portion of market value 
o1,t 
accounted for by unbookable equity and pli,tBVi,t  is the portion 
of market value accounted for by bookable equity.  In the absence of 
measurement error, the theoretical values of the intercept and the slope 
coefficient are zero and one,  respectively, if there are no off-balance-sheet 
items,  and if the bookable assets and liabilities are marked to market. 
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economic solvency  (or  insolvency) of an institution by studying the 
determinants of the market value of its equity.  Assuming the unbookable 
equity of the institution mostly consists of the FDIC guarantees,  Poi,, 
can be taken as an estimate of Gi,,,  the value of federal guarantees. 
This assumption is a strong,  yet appealing, one given that it simplifies the 
model considerably.  Having obtained an estimate of Gi,, within the 
first equation, the next value or stockholder-contributed equity  (NV)  is given 
by substracting GiPt  from the predicted market value of the institution. 
The equation can be estimated both in time-series,  cross-sectional pooled 
data. 
3.2  A Nonlinear Version 
An alternative approach would be to consider a nonlinear version of the 
flexible relationship between market value and book value.  Since stock price 
does not become negative,  a nonlinear function is especially appealing at low 
or negative book values  (see  figure 1). 
The FDIC receives a compound option in exchange for its guarantee. 
However,  as emphasized throughout the paper, the FDIC's  ability to exercise 
this option is limited by its economic,  political,  and bureaucratic 
'constraints. The received option is a call option, written not directly on 
the firm's  assets,  but on the right to close out the firm's stockholders and 
put a given percentage of the insolvent firm's  unallocated losses to the 
uninsured depositors by liquidating the firm  (Kane, 1986).  In order to 
minimize its losses,  the FDIC should exercise its takeover option and close 
the institution as soon as it becomes economically insolvent.  Thus, 
theoretically,  the insurer can take over the equity of the firm at,  or past, 
the point of market-value insolvency.  If the FDIC could exercise its option 
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exercised since net worth is approximately zero and any losses would be 
minimal.  Delays in exercising the takeover option due to the aforementioned 
constraints may allow an already insolvent institution to become more and more 
insolvent,  causing the put half of the compound option to gain importance once 
the call half is eventually exercised.  The implicit and explicit cost to the 
FDIC increases to the extent that regulator's constraints prevent this put 
half of the option from being exercised. 
The nonlinear function shown in figure 1 represents the relationship 
between market and book values.  The broken line is the value of the option at 
expiration when the option is in the money  (the  institution is economically 
solvent).  If the institution is market-value  solvent,  MV approaches a 
constant proportion of BV.  The horizontal axis to the left of point a,  where 
the bank just becomes economically insolvent, is the value of the option at 
expiration when it is out of money.  As the takeover of the bank is delayed 
due to regulator constraints,  and BV decreases to the left of a,  MV approaches 
zero.  The FDIC has the option to take over the firm at,  or to the left of, 
point a. 
Optimally, this option should be exercised at point a,  when the 
institution becomes economically insolvent.  At this point,  MV of the 
institution differs from zero by the value of the charter and federal 
guarantees.  The value of the charter is composed of the value of business 
relationships built over time,  firm-specific  options for profitable future 
business opportunities,  and monopoly rents that may accrue to the institution 
from restrictive branching laws and other regulations that restrict 
competition.  However, we will assume that,  at the point of economic 
insolvency,  the contribution of charter value to MV is negligible.  To the 
extent this assumption is valid,  at point a,  MV  differs from zero by the value 
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interpretations: 
CASE A -  figure 1  (ii):  In the absence of measurement error, if bookable 
assets and liabilities are marked to market and there are no 
off-balance-sheet  items: 
a = the optimal exercise point.  At a,  BV=O  and the bank is economically 
insolvent. 
b = the slope of the asymptote that reflects the relationship between MV  and 
BV  as they approach each other at large positive values.  In this case, 
since the accounting value of the institution's equity represents an 
unbiased estimate of stockholder equity, b is equal to one. 
c = at the exercise point, the MV  of the institution differs from zero by the 
charter value and the value of the FDIC guarantees.  It is where the curve 
intercepts the MV axis. 
CASE B  -  figure 1  (i)  and  (iii):  if bookable equity is not marked to market 
and off-balance-sheet  items exist: 
a = the bank becomes economically insolvent where BV  is greater  (less)  than 
zero if BV  over  (under)  estimates the stockholder equity and 
off-balance-sheet  items are a drain on  (the  source of) the institution's 
capital. 
b = in this case,  accounting value is a biased estimate of stockholder equity. 
If a is greater  (less)  than zero,  a market discount  (premium)  is expected; 
thus, the coefficient is less  (greater)  than one.  There is a discount and 
a premium in figure 1  (i)  and 1  (iii)  respectively. 
c = the interpretation of the coefficient is the same but it is no longer 
given by the MV intercept since c is the value of the firm at a.  The MV 
intercept either under  (figure  1,i)  or over  (figure  1,iii)  estimates c in 
this case. 
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model.  Assuming away the value of the charter at the point of economic 
insolvency allows us to get an estimate of the guarantee value within the 
first equation  (c  = Gi,,).  With this specification, it is also possible 
to allow c to vary for each bank at any point in time by parameterizing it to 
be a function of ris
k
iness of the bank and size of the liabilities 
(cii)  Here,  a linear function is chosen to avoid further 
complication of the model.  However, it is also possible to use a nonlinear 
specification for c. 
The construction of the NV is similar to that of the linear case but c is 
used as an estimate of the guarantee value instead of Po 
Again,  the equation can be estimated both as a time-series for each bank 
and cross-sectionally  in each period or with time-series,  cross-sectional 
pooled data. 
3.3 Choice of Variables in the Failure Eauation 
The point of this paper is that the failure of a financial institution, 
unlike others, is determined by the regulators and not just by market forces. 
Therefore,  it is only appropriate to study failure within the framework of a 
regulator decision-making model.  The financial condition of the institution, 
as summarized by the net value  (NV),  is important but is not the only factor 
that influences the regulator's failure decision.  Regulator constraints,  such 
as political and legal constraints, information and staff constraints, and 
funding constraints reflected in the implicit and explicit reserves of the 
insurance fund,  are also important determinants in the decision-making 
process.  General economic conditions may also influence the failure decision 
through their effect on regulator constraints. 
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constraints.  Exact variable definitions are in table 4. 
The number of examiners,  EX, is a proxy for staff constraint.  Ceteris 
paribus,  inadequate manpower to deal with insolvencies is expected to act as a 
deterrent in making a failure decision.  A good-sized,  highly-skilled staff is 
necessary not only to spot insolvencies but also to go ahead and resolve these 
cases. 
The FDIC's fund size,  R,  is another important constraint.  Naturally 
without adequate funds, insolvencies cannot be resolved,  even if the 
regulators are aware they exist.  Thus,  the failure decision should also be 
dependent on the adequacy of the insurance fund. 
The asset size,  A,  for individual institutions is not included only as an 
economic constraint.  Clearly, the larger the institution,  the more difficult 
it is to financially resolve its insolvency.  Also,  the size variable is 
expected to capture the political and bureaucratic constraints of the 
regulators that become binding,  especially when large institutions are 
concerned.  In an effort to protect their self-interest,  regulators apparently 
try not to get involved with large-bank failures, since they tend to be much 
more visible. 
Number of problem banks, PB,  and a bank failure index,  BFI,  are also 
included to explain regulator behavior.  These variables capture more than one 
effect.  Controlling for the financial condition of the institution, an 
increased number of bank failures or potential bank failures may protect 
institutions from failing due to regulators' political and bureaucratic 
constraints.  To promote safety and soundness of the banking system, 
regulators try to spread failures evenly through time.  Thus,  a large number 
of failure decisions made recently may delay present failure decisions. 
However,  it is also possible to view these variables as lagged taste 
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number of failures or potential failures may actually signal that a regulator 
is getting tougher,  a trend that may continue into the future. 
A general business failure rate,  FI,  is also included to capture the 
political and bureaucratic constraints of the regulators.  Since this variable 
is not related to regulators' past behavior, it should be able to capture the 
protection effect explained above. 
Interest rates and percentage changes in interest rates are also included 
to determine if they have any particular effect on the regulators' 
decision-making  process. 
Finally a charter variable,  C,  is included to see if the decision-making 
process differs among different regulatory bodies.  The decision to fail an 
institution is made by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency if the 
bank has a national charter and by the state banking commission if it has a 
state charter. 
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4.1 The Model 
The model consists of three equations.  The first equation models economic 
insolvency,  the second constructs the net economic value,  and the third 
estimates the probability of the regulator's failure decision.  Since 
determinants of insolvency and failure are based on similar factors,  the error 
terms of these equations,  which capture the unobservable influences,  will be 
correlated  (Maddala, 1986).  This dependence of ul  and % causes 
the otherwise recursive system to become simultaneous.  A recursive system is 
one in  which the matrix of coefficients of the endogenous variables is 
triangular and the contemporaneous covariance matrix is diagonal.  The absence 
of W  from the first equation satisfies the first condition;  however, the 
dependence of the error terms violates the second.  This dependence of ul 
and uZ causes NV to be correlated with uz and a direct estimation of the 
failure equation results in inconsistent estimates.  To obtain consistent 
estimates,  a simultaneous technique has to be used.  A two-stage method 
recommended by Maddala  (1986)  is used in this study. 
In estimation of simultaneous equations,  the problem of identification 
arises.  It is concerned with the question of whether any specific equation in 
a model can in fact be estimated.  In other words,  it is not a matter of 
estimation method,  but whether meaningful estimates of structural coefficients 
can be obtained.  For identification,  (1)  restrictions on structural 
parameters,  (2)  restrictions on the covariance matrix, and/or (3) 
respecification of the model to incorporate additional variables may be 
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independent  (upon  which the system becomes recursive) or,  in our case,  at 
least one regressor from the first equation not to be included among the 
regressors of the failure equation. 
4.2  The First Equation 
The specification of the first equation was tested by including the proxy 
variables from the failure equation.  The proxy variables and their various 
combinations were rejected by F-tests in favor of the simplest model.  The 
stability of the coefficients was tested using a Chow test. This is a test of 
equality between two sets of coefficients that are estimated from subsamples 
(usually  of equal size) of the original sample.  The statistic has an F 
distribution.  The hypothesis of no structural shift could not be rejected for 
the pooled sample of failed and nonfailed banks at a 5 percent significance 
level.  Due to autocorrelated disturbances,  a Cochrane-Orcutt method was used 
in estimation.  This is an iterative method that gives estimators that 
converge to maximum likelihood estimators.  Presence of heteroskedasticity was 
detected using Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey  and Goldfeld-Quandt tests. The 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test has a chi-square statistic based on the regression 
of squared residuals on the explanatory variables. The Goldfeld-Quandt test 
splits the sample in two and calculates a ratio of residual sums of squares 
from the two regressions.  The resulting statistic has an F distribution.  In 
both tests, the null hypothesis is a homoskedastic error structure. 
To correct for heteroskedasticity,  the first equation  (including  the 
constant-term) was deflated by  (i)  total assets,  and  (ii)  book value. 
However,  because heteroskedasticity tests after these corrections still 
indicated the presence of heteroskedasticity,  White's (1980)  consistent 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyestimator of the variance-covariance matrix was calculated.  When the process 
generating the heteroskedasticity is unknown,  White suggests using the 
undeflated least-squares  coefficient estimates,  since they remain 
unbiased and consistent. 
Yet for hypothesis testing,  his alternative estimator of the 
variance-covariance matrix needs to be used instead of the least squares 
covariance matrix estimator,  which is ificonsistent. White's estimator does 
not require a formal modeling of the structure of the heteroskedasticity  since 
it requires only the regressors and the estimated least squares residuals for 
its computation and,  in cases when heteroskedasticity cannot be estimated, it 
allows correct inferences and confidence intervals to be obtained. 
In estimating the first equation for failed institutions owned by bank 
holding companies  (approximately  1/5th of the failed sample),  an additional 
problem arises. 
The data used are the individual bank's book value.  However, the holding 
company's market value is used instead of the bank's market value,  since the 
stock of the bank seldom trades separately.  As Kane and Unal  (1989)  discuss 
at length, to the extent that holding companies have other bank and nonbank 
subsidiaries, and to the extent that the book value of these subsidiaries are 
correlated with the book value of the bank, the regression estimates will be 
biased.  In  order to see the extent of this bias,  the first equation was also 
estimated omitting the holding-company-owned  failed banks.  Fortunately,  the 
bias does not seem to be important since the regression estimates of the test 
run were not statistically different from the ones obtained from the full 
sample.  For the nonfailed banks, this problem does not arise because the 
holding companies included in the sample are one or multibank holding 
companies without nonbank subsidiaries,  and holding company market value and 
consolidated book value are used in estimating the regressions. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyThe linear version of the first equation was estimated using ordinary 
lease squares  (OLS)  for individual banks' time-series and also  for all banks 
using time-series,  cross-section pooled data.  The nonlinear version of the 
equation was estimated using nonlinear least squares  (NLS)  with panel data. 
The coefficient that captures the FDIC quarantees, Cinlt,  was 
parameterized to be a linear function of the institution's rick and size of 
the liabilities.  The average annual stock price range was used to proxy risk; 
liabilities were given by the total assets,  minus the book value.  This 
specification allows the FDIC guarantee value to vary both across time and 
among institutions with respect to their size and riskiness. 
4.3 The Failure Equation 
The limited variation permitted in the dependent variable of the second 
equation makes it equivalent to a qualitative response or choice model 
(Amemiya  [I9811 and Maddala [1983]).  In these statistical models, the 
endogenous random variables take only discrete values.  When the dependent 
variable is dichotomous,  which is the case in our failure equation,  then the 
model becomes a binary-choice model. 
As Amemiya states,  in such models it does not matter whether a probit or a 
logit model is used.  However, since in our case the sampling rates of 
failures and nonfailures are unequal,  the estimated coefficients of the probit 
model are biased.  This problem does not arise with the logit model,  which 
makes it preferable to the probit model  (Maddala,  [I983  and 19861).  Thus, the 
Logit Maximum Likelihood Method is used in estimating the failure equation. 
The method is actually a two-stage one,  since in the first stage NV is 
constructed by subtracting the federal guarantee estimate from the predicted 
MV.  The reason predicted MV is used instead of the actual MV is that MV is 
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equation coefficients.  In the second stage, this constructed NV is used as 
one of the explanatory variables and the failure equation is estimated by 
logit technique using pooled data. 
One problem with the two-stage method should be noted.  The asymptotic 
variance-covariance matrix from the second stage underestimates the correct 
standard errors because it ignores the fact that the explanatory variable NV 
is estimated.  The correct asymptotic variance-covariance matrix is calculated 
using Arnemiya's (1978,  1979) method.  The corrected variance-covariance matrix 
has an extra positive semidefinite term that the two-stage method omits. 
When evaluating binary choice models,  care must be taken  (Judge  et al. 
[1985]).  Estimated coefficients do not indicate the increase in the 
probability of the failure decision given a one-unit increase in the 
corresponding independent variable.  Instead, the amount of increase in 
probability depends upon the original probability and thus upon the initial 
values of all the independent variables and their coefficients.  This is true 
since P(F=l)  =  F(Xp)  and 6P(F=1)/6xi  = f  (Xp)p,,  where f  ( .) is the 
probability density function associated with F( .  ) .  Therefore, while the 
size of the coefficient indicates the direction of the change,  the magnitude 
depends upon f(.),  which reflects the steepness of the cumulative distribution 
function at Xj3.  In other words,  a change in the explanatory variable has 
different effects on the probability of failure decision,  depending on the 
bank's initial probability of failure.  This is intuitively plausible,  since 
one would expect that if a bank has an extremely high  (or  low) probability of 
failure,  a marginal change in the independent variables will have little 
effect on its prospects.  The same marginal change might have a great effect 
if the bank's probability of failure were somewhere around 0.5. 
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Panel data are used in estimating this model.  A list of failed banks with 
assets over $90 million  (since  smaller banks seldom have actively traded 
stocks) was obtained from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Annual 
Reports for the period 1973-1988.  Annual data on number of shares,  book 
value per share, total assets,  and price range were collected from Moody's 
Bank Manual for each bank,  where possible,  from 1963 up to the date of 
failure. 
The names of the 32 failed banks,  for which complete data could be 
collected,  are given in table 1.  Banks have an asset size range of $92 
million to $47 billion.  A random sample of 42 nonfailed banks within this 
asset range having roughly similar asset size dispersion was chosen. 
Nonfailed banks are from the same geographic locations as the failed banks, 
have actively traded stock,  and are FDIC members.  The same annual data were 
collected for the nonfailed banks. 
Interest-rate data are obtained from Standard and Poor's  Basic 
Statistics.  The business-failure  rate is from Dun & Bradstreet's 
Business Failure Record.  The charter data are obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors reports of condition data tapes.  The data for the 
rest of the variables are collected from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Annual Reports.  For variable definitions see table 2. 
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5.1  First Equation Results 
The linear version of the first equation is estimated with time-series 
data for each bank individually and with pooled data for all institutions. The 
results for individual banks are given in table 3.  The coefficient estimates 
can be summarized as follows: 
p,,  the intercept, is significant 34  percent of the time.  Its sign is 
positive in almost all the cases,  implying that the off-balance-sheet 
items serve as a net source of the institutions' capital.  One positive 
component of the intercept is the value of the federal deposit 
insurance guarantee and this positive value is consistent with the 
hypothesis that underpriced deposit insurance would contribute 
significantly to the market values of undercapitalized institutions. 
pl,  the BV coefficient, is highly significant and positive 95 percent of 
the time. It is significantly different from unity in 60 percent of the 
cases and is less than unity in 45 percent of the cases.  The combined 
j? =O  and pl=l  condition necessary for recorded equity to be an 
unbiased estimate of market value holds only for 28 perecent of the 
banks.  These figures are consistent with Kane's  (1985)  claim that 
accounting representations of the economic performance of major banks 
are somewhat deceptive. 
The results of the first equation, estimated using time-series 
cross-section pooled data for failed,  nonfailed,  and all pooled samples,  are 
given in table 4. Pooled OLS results are consistent with the results for 
individual banks  . 
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significant for failed and all pooled samples. Also,  the intercept of the 
failed banks is significantly greater than those of the nonfailed and all 
pooled samples, indicating the higher value of the deposit insurance guarantee 
for undercapitalized institutions. 
The slope coefficients of all samples are significantly  (at  10 percent for 
nonfailed banks) less than unity and the slope coefficient of the failed banks 
is significantly less than those of the nonfailed and all banks.  These 
results indicate not only that the market discounts financial institutions' 
bookable equity,  but also that the bookable equity of the failed institutions 
is discounted to a greater extent. 
The nonlinear version of the first equation is estimated with pooled data 
and the results are also given in table 4.  The coefficient c,  which is 
expected to capture the value of the federal guarantees,  is parameterized to 
be a linear  (as  a convenient simplification) function of the institution's 
riskiness and size of its liabilities.  NLS results are similar to those 
obtained using OLS: 
a,  the exercise price,  where the institutions are economically insolvent, 
is positive and significant for all three samples.  This indicates that 
the BV of financial institutions significantly overstates MV.  The 
extent of overvaluation as a percentage of total assets is about 4 
percent for nonfailed and 6 percent for failed banks.  The BV of failed 
institutions typically overstates their MV to a significantly greater 
extent than that of healthy institutions. 
b,  the slope of the asymptote,  corresponds to  in SMVAM.  The results 
obtained are the same; the market discounts the bookable equity of 
institutions in general, and the BV of failed banks is discounted 
significantly more. 
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all cases.  As expected,  the value of the FDIC guarantees increases 
with an increase in the riskiness of the institutions.  It is also 
important to note that an equal amount of additional risk increases the 
value of the guarantee for the unhealthy institutions to a 
significantly greater extent  (about  10 times greater) than the healthy 
ones  . 
e,  the coefficient of the size of liabilities,  is also positive and 
significant for all samples.  Naturally, the value of the guarantee 
increases as the liabilities increase.  However again,  an equal amount 
of increase in liabilities increases the value of the guarantee 
significantly more for unhealthy institutions than for healthy ones. 
E, the mean value of the FDIC guarantees implied by d and e coefficients 
and the mean value of risk and liabilities,  is significantly positive 
for each group.  The value of the guarantee is significantly greater 
for the failed banks as expected. 
The results for both the linear and nonlinear versions of the first 
equation indicate significant differences among failed and nonfailed banks. To 
sum up,  the value of unbookable equity is much higher for unhealthy 
institutions.  Also,  the valuation ratio of the market to book value of these 
institutions' bookable equity is significantly lower than that of healthy 
ones.  The BV of unhealthy institutions overstates their MV  to a greater 
extent and these institutions enjoy a greater FDIC guarantee value that 
increases more with a marginal increase in risk or liability size.  The book 
value accounting is misleading in general and it seems to misrepresent the 
economic performance of the unhealthy institutions to a greater extent. 
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The failure equation is estimated using  (i)  a linear version and  (ii)  a 
nonlinear version of the first equation.  The key difference is in the way the 
NV variable is constructed.  As explained in section 111,  the linear version 
constructs NV by subtracting the estimate of unbookable equity (Po) from 
the predicted MV  of the institutions.  The NV obtained from the nonlinear 
version subtracts the c value again from the predicted MV of the institutions. 
For failed and nonfailed banks,  their respective pooled sample coefficient 
estimates are used.  For comparison purposes, the failure equation is 
estimated using BV instead of NV, as well as using both BV and NV for each 
case.  Also, the relative importance of the regulator constraint variables, BV 
and NV is examined. 
The results of the failure equation, using the linear version of the first 
equation, are presented in table 5: 
The constant term is negative and significant,  implying that the higher 
the overall average charter value of the institutions,  that is,  the higher the 
value of institutions' ongoing customer relationships and profitable future 
business opportunities,  the less likely the regulators are to fail an 
institution. 
As expected, the coefficient of net value is also negative and 
significant.  Clearly,  an increase in the net economic value of an institution 
reduces the pressure the regulators feel to fail it.  BV,  when included 
without the NV,  also has a negative and significant coefficient.  However, 
when it is included with NV,  its coefficient loses its significance. 
Regulator constraint variables,  such as the number of examiners and the 
insurance fund,  both have positive and significant coefficients.  Ceteris 
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relaxing the economic constraints against failure,  makes a failure decision 
for an institution more likely.  For given skill levels and population of 
clients,  the greater the number of examiners employed at time t-1,  the more 
thorough the examinations will be.  This increases the probability that the 
FDIC will discover insolvent institutions,  making a failure decision for an 
institution more likely at time t.  Similarly an increase in the available 
funds to the FDIC would increase the probability of an insolvent institution's 
failure and supervisory merger. 
The coefficients of the bank-failure index and the number of problem banks 
are also positive and significant.  These two variables capture three separate 
and possibly counteracting effects.  First,  the number of problem banks and 
the failure index are lagged taste variables.  A higher failure index or 
number of problem banks at time t-1  indicates that regulators are getting 
tougher in dealing with institutions,  which makes it more likely that an 
individual institution  will fail at time t. Second,  a higher bank-failure 
index signals a deterioration of the economic environment for banks in general 
and it is expected to increase the probability of a failure decision for 
individual banks.  Similarly, the FDIC's  problem bank list includes those 
banks recognized as possessing low capital adequacy,  asset quality, management 
skills,  earnings,  and/or  liquidity.  Many of these banks may be de facto 
insolvent.  To the extent authorities try to delay failure,  potential failures 
(many  of which are beyond saving) tend to appear on this list for some time 
before being acted upon.  Therefore, an increase in potential failures at time 
t-1  may also be indicative of the deteriorating economic environment for banks 
and of an increase in the probability of a failure decision for individual 
banks at time t.  Third,  given that the financial condition of an institution 
is controlled for,  an increase in bank failures or number of problem banks may 
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political and bureaucratic constraints and self-serving incentives.  In  the 
face of accumulating trouble,  regulators may become more lenient in their 
failure policies in an effort to cover-up and get-away.  This final factor 
counteracts the first two.  The positive coefficients obtained for these 
variables indicate that the first two factors are larger in magnitude than the 
last one. 
A general business failure rate is perhaps a better indicator of 
the overall economy and should be able to capture this "protection" effect 
more clearly,  since its coefficient is not blurred by the first two effects. 
When included,  the coefficient is indeed consistently negative.  However, it 
fails to be significant. 
The coefficients of asset size and relative asset size with respect to the 
insurance fund are negative and significant.  These variables not only capture 
economic constraints but also capture the political and bureaucratic 
constraints associated with so-called "too large to fail" banks.  The 
coefficients reflect the well-known tendency of the regulators to treat the 
larger banks differently  . 
The interest and percentage change in interest variables have positive but 
insignificant coefficients.  They do not add significant information to the 
decision-making process. 
Finally,  the coefficient of the charter variable is negative but 
insignificant.  This indicates that although the federal regulators tend to be 
more lenient,  the decision-making processes of the federal and state 
regulators are not statistically different. 
The coefficient estimates all have expected signs and most of the key 
variables turn out to significantly affect the regulators' failure decision, 
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standard errors may err in the direction of nonsignificance in the case of 
logit models. 
The predictive power of the model is also given in table 5.  The two types 
of errors are error 1,  the error of misclassifying a failed bank as nonfailed, 
and error 2,  the error of misclassifying a nonfailed bank as failed.  Error 1 
has a range of 3 percent  (only  one bank misclassified) to 9 percent  (3  banks 
were misclassified).  The specification  using BV instead of NV misclassifies 16 
percent of the failed banks.  Error 2 has a range of 10 percent to 16 percent 
for different specifications and,  using BV instead of NV,  the model 
misclassifies 14  percent of the nonfailures.  It is often argued that the 
costs of these misclassification  errors are not the same and that error 1 is 
relatively more costly.  However,  if we assume these costs are the same and 
also weigh the two errors equally,  this equally weighted total correct 
prediction determines the discriminatory power of the model. Alternative 
specifications of the model have 88 percent to 93.5 percent prediction 
accuracy. The lowest prediction accuracy is 85 percent, which belongs to the 
single equation specification  with BV instead of NV. 
The results of the failure equation,  using the nonlinear version of the 
first equation,  are presented in table 6.  Obtained results are not 
substaritially different. The explanatory variables have the same signs. One 
difference is that the interest varible gains significance,  but the size 
variable is no longer significant with this specification.  Summary statistics 
are improved, indicating a better fit,  and predictive power is slightly 
higher.  The range of error 1 is lower at 3 percent to 6 percent and error 2 
is unchanged.  Thus equally-weighted prediction accuracy is also slightly 
improved at 89.5 percent to 93.5 percent. 
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failure equation is estimated using  (1)  only regulator constraints,  (2)  only 
BV,  (3)  only NV from linear specification,  and  (4)  only NV from nonlinear 
specification.  The results are given in table 7.  It is interesting to see 
that the model with only regulator constraint variables has a prediction 
accuracy of 76 percent.  This is almost as high as the discriminatory power of 
the model with only BV,  which is 77.5 percent.  The NV,  obtained from the 
linear specification,  does significantly better in classifying the failed 
banks.  The error 1 falls to 16 percent and prediction accuracy increases to 
80 percent. Finally, the NV obtained from the nonlinear specification does 
even better. Almost all the failed banks  (except  one) are correctly classified 
with error 1 at 3 percent.  Its prediction accuracy is also the highest among 
the four specifications,  at 85 percent. 
Although the nonlinear version of the first equation does seem to produce 
an estimate of NV that has a greater discriminatory power by itself, the 
results of the full model indicate that the linear version of the first 
equation does equally well.  The linear version may be preferred in practice 
since it simplifies the estimation of the model considerably. 
The results obtained from the failure equation shed light on various 
issues.  First,  regulator constraints are important in determination of the 
failure decision.  Second,  NV  is a much better indicator of financial 
condition than BV.  Third,  nonlinear estimation of the first equation seems to 
enhance the NV's own discriminatory power, probably better capturing the true 
net economic value of the unhealthy institutions. 
In  conclusion, the best failure model,  as hypothesized throughout,  is the 
one that allows both the financial condition of the institutions and tfie 
regulator constraints to determine the decision-making process.  Although NV 
is a good indicator of the likelihood of a failure decision,  the 
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constraints are taken into consideration.  This is expected since failure is a 
regulator-determined event and regulator constraints do have a significant 
additional contribution in explaining the decision-making process. 
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The purpose of this paper is to develop an accurate model of large bank 
failures.  In  order to achieve this end, insolvency and failure of 
institutions are studied simultaneously and economic,  political, and 
bureaucratic regulator constraints are taken into account.  The maintained 
hypothesis throughout the study is that the contribution of regulator 
constraints to the failure determination is significant since failure is a 
regulator-determined  event,  and any model of bank failure that does not 
distinguish between failure and insolvency cannot be complete. 
In  studying the insolvency of institutions,  the importance of obtaining a 
stockholder-contributed equity value is stressed.  Through the use of Kane and 
Unal's (forthcoming  1989) SMVAM,  the market value of the institutions' equity 
is decomposed into its components.  The results of the insolvency equation 
indicate major differences between failed and nonfailed banks.  The unbookable 
equity of failed institutions is much greater than that of the nonfailed 
institutions.  Further,  the bookable equity,  which is discounted in general 
for all institutions,  is discounted to a greater extent for failed 
institutions.  The value of the federal deposit-insurance guarantee,  which is 
a positive component of the institution's unbookable equity,  is greater for 
failed institutions and increases with an increase in the riskiness of the 
institution or the size of its liabilities.  Also,  an equal increase in 
riskiness or liability size induces a greater increase in guarantee value for 
the unhealthy banks. 
The failure equation studies the regulator's failure decision process. The 
net value of the institution constructed from the insolvency equation is an 
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condition of the institution.  However,  as expected, the regulator constraint 
variables also play a significant role in failure determination. Net economic 
value has a discriminatory power that consistently outperforms that of the 
book value.  This is not surprising since the first equation results indicate 
that book value greatly misrepresents the financial condition of the 
institutions and especially that of the failed ones. 
The model of bank failure developed in this study is more complete since 
it takes into consideration  a previously ignored determinant of the 
decision-making  process.  The results obtained support the approach taken in 
this paper. 
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FIGURE  I:  MV =  0.5b(BV-a) 
(i  MV 
Source:  Author 
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United States National Bank  1.3B  P&A 
San Diego,  California 
(USN) 
Franklin National Bank 
New York,  N.Y. 
(F'NB) 
American City Bank & Trust  148M 
Co.,  N.A.,  Milwaukee,  Wisconsin 
(ACB) 
Security National Bank  198M 
Long Island,  New York 
(SNB) 
The Hamilton National Bank  412M 
of Chattanooga,  Tennessee 
(HNB 
International City Bank &  176M 
Trust Co.,  New Orleans, 
Louisiana  (ICB) 
The Drovers' National Bank  227M 
of Chicago,  Illinois 
(  DNB) 
First Pennsylvania Bank,  N.A. 
Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania 
(  FPC 
Oklahoma National Bank & 
Trust Co.,  Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma  (ONB) 
United American Bank in 
Knoxville,  Knoxville, 




Best available copyTable 1: List of Failed Banks  (continued) 
Date 
-~~ 











American City Bank 
Los Angeles, California 
(ACB) 
The First National Bank  1.4B 
of Midland,  Midland,  Texas 
The Mississippi Bank 
Jackson,  Mississippi 
(MBJ  ) 
Continental Illinois National  47B 
Bank & Trust Co.,  Chicago, 
Illinois  (CIB) 
Citizens National Bank &  166M 
Trust Co.,  Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma  (CNO) 
First State Bank & Trust Co. 
Edinburg,  Texas 
(FSB) 
Bossier Bank & Trust Co. 
Bossier City, Louisiana 
(BBT) 
The First National Bank & 
Trust Co.,  Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma (J?NB) 
American Bank & Trust Co. 
Lafayette  , Louisiana 
(ABL) 
Panhandle Bank & Trust Co. 
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First Citizens Bank 
Dallas,  Texas 
(FCB) 
First National Bank &  92.4M 
 rust Co. of Enid, Oklahoma 
(FBT) 
Security National Bank &  174.4M  P&A 
Trust Co.,  Norman, 
Oklahoma  (SBT) 
Alaska National Bank 
of the North,  Alaska 
(ANB 
Bank of Dallas 
Dallas,  Texas 
(BOD) 
Union Bank & Trust 
Co.,  Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma  (UBT) 
First City Bancorp 
of Texas,  Houston, 
Texas  (CBT) 
Bank of Santa Fe 
Santa Fe,  New Mexico 
(BSF) 
First Republicbank 
Dallas, N.A.,  Dallas, 
Texas (FRC) 
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Date  Bank  Assets  How 
1989*  Texas American Bancshares Inc.  5.9B 
Texas  (TAB) 
1989*  National Bancshares Corp  2.7B 
of Texas,  Texas 
(NBC) 
Notes:  * indicates that a failure decision is pending. 
P&A  -  Purchase & Assumption transaction  (23) 
OBA -  Open Bank Assistance  (4) 
P  -  Deposit Payoff  (1) 
R  -  Reorganization  (1) 
B  -  Bridge Bank  (1) 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Annual Reports. 
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Best available copyTable 2: Variable Definitions and Sources 
First Equation 
MV,  -  market value of the institution's  equity at time t. MV is the 
price per share multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding.  All data are obtained from Moody's  B& 
Manuals. 
BV,  -  book value of the institution's  equity at time  t.  BV  is the 
book value of assets,  minus the book value of liabilities and 
is given by the sum of common stock capital,  surplus, 
undivided profits, and reserves.  Data are obtained from 
Moody's  Bank Manuals. 
Failure Equation 
Ft  -  the binary failure variable as explained in section 11. 
NV,  -  the  stockholder-contributed  net  equity  value  of  the 
institution at time t.  It is constructed by equation 2 in 
section 11. 
EX,  -  the number of examiners the FDIC employs at time t.  It is 
obtained from the FDIC's Annual Reports. 
BFI,  -  business failure rate at time t.  This variable is obtained 
from Dun &  Bradstreet's Business Failure Record. 
FI,  -  bank failure index at time t.  This variable is calculated 
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Annual 
Report,  table 122.  The calculation is based on total 
deposits of failed institutions and 1970 is taken as the base 
year. 
PB,  -  number of problem banks at time t.  It is obtained from 
various issues of the FDIC's  Annual Reports. 
Rt  -  the FDIC insurance fund at time t.  It is obtained from the 
FDIC's  Annual Reports. 
A,  -  total asset size of the institution at time t,  as given in 
Moody's Bank Manuals. 
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Best available copyTable 2: Variable Definitions and Sources  (continued) 
INT,  -  yearly average of the 6-month T-bill rate calculated from 
monthly data.  It is obtained from Standard and Poor's 
Basic Statistics. 
TINt -  percentage change in the INT  variable. 
ct  -  a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the bank has a 
national charter and the value zero if it has a state charter. 
Data are  obtained from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
reports of condition data tapes. 
Guarantee Equation 
Gt  -  the FDIC guarantee value at time t. 
Bt  -  the face value of the institution's debt at time t. 
vt  -  current value of the assets of the institution at time t. 
rt  -  market rate of interest on riskless securities at time t. 
T  -  length of time until the next audit of the bank's  assets. 
a2,  -  the instantaneous variance of the value of assets 
for the institution at time t. 
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1963  -75 
DNB 
1963  -77 
FPC 
1968  -79 
ONB 
1963  -81 
UAB 
1963  -  82 
ACB 
1964-  82 
FNM 
MBJ 
1963  -  83 
CIB 
1963  -  83 
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Best available copyTable 3 :  First Equation Results for Each Bank with Time-Series Data 
Linear Version  (continued) 
Banks 
Po  PI  R~ 
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Best available copyTable 3 : First Equation Results for Each Bank with Time-Series Data 
Linear Version  (continued) 
Banks 
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Best available copyTable 3 : First Equation Results for Each Bank with Time-Series Data 
Linear Version  (continued) 
Banks 
Po  PI  R~ 
Operating Banks: 
BTN 




























Best available copyTable 3 :  First Equation.Results  for Each Bank with Time-Series Data 





Notes:  Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
Superscripts: *  significantly differs from zero at 5% 
**  significantly differs from zero at 1% 
Subscripts:  *  significantly differs from one at 5% 
**  significantly differs from one at 1% 
The annual data on number of shares,  book value per share, and 
price range were collected from Moody's  Bank 
Manual for each bank. 
Source:  Author. 
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Best available copyTable 4: First Equation Results with Pooled Samples 
Linear and Nonlinear Versions 
1.  Nonfailed Banks Pooled -  1963-87: 
OLS:  j3  : 14.019  j3,:  0.804*** 
(10.313)  (0.129) 
NLS:  a: 81.315***  b: 0.832***  d: 6.766***  e: 0.005***  E: 11.040*** 
(9.618)  (0.030)  (2.644)  (0.001)  (3.027) 
2.  Failed Banks Pooled -  1963-87: 
OLS:  j3 : 52.155***  PI: 0.516*** 
(13.739)  (0.073) 
NLS:  a: 122.910***  b: 0.524***  d: 69.344***  e: 0.017***  E: 54.870*** 
(6.911)  (0.125)  (9.276)  (0.003)  (6.301) 
3.  Failed/Nonfailed Banks Pooled -  1963-87: 
OLS:  j3 : 25.159***  j3,:  0.721*** 
(7.122)  (0.083) 
NLS:  a: 95.815***  b: 0.716***  d: 14.838***  e: 0.0124***  E: 27.073*** 
(8.586)  (0.022)  (3.954)  (0.001)  (1.834) 
See notes to table 7. 
Source: Author. 
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Best available copyTable 5: Logit Analysis of Bank Failures -  First Equation Linear 
Dependent Variable : Failure 
Independent  Alternative Specifications 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Const. 
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Best available copyTable 5:  Logit Analysis of Bank Failures -  First Equation Linear 
(continued) 
Alternative Specifications 
(1)  (2)  (3  (4)  (5) 
Summary Statistics 
Model 
Chi-square  121.87***  118.75***  122.79***  130.35***  165.69*** 
-2 Log L  184.63  187.75  183.71  168.48  133.14 
Classification 
Error 1  3  % 
Error 2  16% 
Total Correct  90.5% 
See notes to table 7 
Source:  Author 
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Best available copyTable 6: Logit Analysis of Bank Failures -  First Equation Nonlinear 
De~endent  Variable : Failure 
Independent  Alternative Specifications 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3  (4)  (5) 
Cons  t  . 
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Best available copyTable 6: Logit Analysis of Bank Failures -  First Equation Nonlinear 
(continued) 
Alternative Specifications 
(1)  (2  (3  (4)  (5) 
Summary Statistics 
Model 
Chi-square  135.94***  131.97***  137.14***  130.35***  165.67*** 
-2  Log L  170.56  174.54  169.36  168.48  133.16 
Classification 
Error 1  3  %  6  %  3  %  16%  3  % 
Error 2  16%  15%  15%  14%  10% 
Total Correct  90.5%  89.5%  91%  85%  93.5% 
See notes to table 7. 
Source:  Author. 
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Best available copyTable 7: Failure Decision -  Regulator Constraints vs. Financial Condition 
Dependent Variable :  Failure 
Independent  Alternative Specifications 
Variables  (1)  (2  (3  (4) 
Const.  -108.140***  -13.138***  -11.194***  -11.852*** 
(26.596)  (1.369)  (1.209)  (1.454) 
INT 
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Best available copyTable 7 : Failure Decision -  Regulator Constraints vs. Financial Condition 
(continued) 
Alternative Specifications 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Summarv Statistics 
Model Chi-square  94.14***  69.94***  59.89***  73.01*** 





Notes:  Standard errors are given in parentheses.  Single,  double, 
triple asterisks indicate significance at 10,  5,  1 percents 
respectively.  Interest data are obtained from Standard and 
Poor's Basic Statistics.  Bank-failure index is calculated from 
the FDIC's 1987 Annual Re~ort,  table 122,  base year taken as 
1970.  Business-failure rate is obtained from Dun &  Bradstreet's 
Business Failure Record.  Year-end book value,  price range, 
number of shares outstanding,  and asset size variables are 
collected from Moody's  Bank Manual.  The data for the rest of 
the variables are obtained from FDIC Annual Re~orts. 
Source:  Author. 
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